Complex, dynamic networks underlie many systems, and understanding these networks is the concern of a great span of important scientific and engineering problems. Quantitative description is crucial for this understanding yet, due to a range of measurement problems, many real network datasets are incomplete. Here we explore how accidentally missing or deliberately hidden nodes may be detected in networks by the effect of their absence on predictions of the speed with which information flows through the network. We use Symbolic Regression (SR) to learn models relating information flow to network topology. These models show localized, systematic, and nonrandom discrepancies when applied to test networks with intentionally masked nodes, demonstrating the ability to detect the presence of missing nodes and where in the network those nodes are likely to reside.
Introduction
The field of complex networks has emerged and matured over the last 15 years, heralded by small-world [1] and scale-free networks [2] , and principally enabled by the advent of readily available large-scale datasets. Much work has been focused on simple descriptions of complex networks, leading to an evolving collection of structures, network statistics [3, 4] , and generative mechanisms [5, 6, 2] .
All along, the problem of missing data has been both obvious and ubiquitous-few network datasets are complete or nearly so-and yet this issue has largely been ignored. The body of work that does exist on missing data has mostly focused on the problem of unrecorded edges or interactions [7, 8, 9, 10] , while only some have explored the harder problems of node and context omission [11, 12, 13] using various approaches such as inference based on maximum likelihood estimation [14, 15] .
While missing data is certainly understood to affect-sometimes dramatically-different kinds of static network statistics in different ways [11] , the effects of measurement error on dynamic, real social networks [16, 17, 18, 19] remain largely unknown. This problem is especially challenging when the amount of data omission is not known and can only be estimated from the observed data set. The implications for how to contend with a given network, suspected to be corrupted in some fashion, are substantial. In the case of public health policy, for example, positive evidence for the role of social contagion in the spreading of such disparate attributes as happiness [20] , obesity [21] , and loneliness [22] , have been challenged due to their reliance on under-sampled reconstructed social networks [23] .
A systematic framework to accommodate missing data for static and dynamic networks remains elusive, and provides a great challenge to the network science community. Much success in the study of complex, dynamic networks has come from approaches born out of statistical mechanics and dynamical systems, with the great example arguably being Simon's rich-get-richer model underlying scale-free networks [5, 6, 2] . Yet it is clear that many adaptive complex systems are strongly algorithmic in nature, and are not well or completely described by integrodifferential equations.
Briefly, our approach to studying missing or hidden node detection is as follows. First, we construct a set of network topologies (Sec. 2.1). We then use an idealized transaction model to simulate the flow of information "packets" across these networks. These packets could represent IP packets flowing across a computer network, citations within a scientific collaboration network, or messages passed among members of a social network such as Twitter (Sec. 2.2).
Next, the resulting transaction data is collected and fed to a stochastic optimization method. This goal of this step is to generate a mathematical model that predicts the speed of information flow between pairs of nodes in the network, given structural information about those nodes and the network they were drawn from (Sec. Packet Time Figure 1 : Illustration motivating the method. Nodes in this network pass information around (packets), and we monitor the arrival times of these packets. The two blue nodes appear much farther apart topologically when the red node is hidden. Given the observed information flows, the highlighted packet would appear to be arriving unusually quickly given the apparent long distance path it likely took (red links). This unexpectedly rapid flow may be a clue that unseen network elements are present.
tematic errors or biases in the model's prediction of information flow, this indicates that nodes may have been added or removed from the network.
The intuition underlying our approach to node prediction may be clarified by considering the cartoon example in Fig. 1 . Two nodes are connected by a third node, making them two steps apart on the network topology. Due to their close proximity, information should flow between them relatively quickly, on average. However, if the bridge node is hidden from us, we may erroneously conclude these two nodes are actually quite far apart (illustrated in the figure by the red path). We would then expect information flow should be slow between them, even for information originating from other parties, and we would be surprised by the speed of flow we actually observe. If we consistently overestimate the time it takes for information to appear at one node after it appears at the other, then this provides evidence that a hidden presence in the network is facilitating the flow of information.
Methods
Here we describe the network topologies we will employ in this study, the details of how we simulate information flow on these topologies, the predictive models we generate for the flow times, and the test procedure and measurements we use to explore how well hidden nodes can be detected.
Network model
To gauge the potential of our approach, we first developed it against simulated transactional networks. We used scalefree networks generated according to the common preferential attachment model [5, 6, 2] . Each scale-free network was grown to a size of N = 250 nodes by adding new nodes one at a time, and each new node attached to two existing nodes preferentially according to their degree [2] . These undirected networks have a power-law degree distribution
The earlier a node is added to the network, the higher the degree it will tend to have. So hubs, highly connected nodes, tend to be among the early nodes of the network.
Transaction dynamics
For each network that was constructed, we simulated transactions, the creation and movement of packets of content, occurring between pairs of connected nodes. Each packet carries a unique identifier so that it can be tracked when it appears at different nodes in the network, and each node maintains a growing, time-ordered list of the content packets it has received. We simulated transactions as follows. At each time step, each node is activated with probability p = 1.
This may represent a member of an online social network logging into their account, or a node in a computer network being turned on. For each node that is activated, it creates a new piece of content with probability p create = 1/9
or imports a piece of content from a neighbor with probability p import = 2p create . In the former case, this may correspond to a member of the social network Twitter creating a new tweet; in the latter case it may correspond to them "retweeting" a tweet from someone they follow. The above probabilities were chosen to plausibly model the relative frequencies of creating versus importing content; an experimenter may equally estimate their values from a real dataset.
If a node i chooses to create a new packet, a new ID is generated and that packet is added to i's list of content.
Neighbors of i may later choose to import this new packet into their own content lists, letting it spread throughout the network. Importing works as follows. If node i chooses to import content, one of i's neighboring nodes j is selected at random (assuming it has neighbors). Once j is selected, the information packets in j's list are scanned from most recently generated (or imported) to earliest generated (or imported). The scan stops when an information packet is found that is not contained in i's list. If no such packet can be found, no action for node i is taken and the next activated node is considered. If such a packet is found, it is copied from node j to node i.
This process is repeated for the next node that has been activated during the current time step. The simulation of transactions halts when 3000 time steps elapse. With the chosen values of p create and p import , each node will on average participate in the transaction model 1000 times. To avoid any pathological effects the nodes are activated in randomized order for each time step.
Once the transactions have been simulated and we have a timeline of packets for each node, we then compute the average time it takes for packets to flow between nodes. For every pair of nodes in a graph, we computed the intersection between their respective sets of information packets. We thus obtained each packet that both nodes in a pair either imported or created. We then computed the average time T i j required for packets to travel between nodes i and j
where n i j packets are shared by nodes i and j, and t
(k)
i indicates the time step at which packet k was created (or arrived) at node i. In order to remove noise resulting from small sample sizes, all T i j for which n i j < 100 were discarded. Note that we are not measuring a causal or directional relationship between the node pair; a shared packet could easily have been created by a third node and then eventually reached both i and j through the importing process. The delay time T i j is a dynamical measure of closeness between the nodes.
Symbolic Regression
Given a network topology and the information flow times T i j (Eq. (1)), we then constructed a matrix D to serve as the dataset for training models to predict T i j as a function of the structural properties of nodes i and j. Each pair of nodes is allocated its own row. One column in D contains the T i j values, while the remaining columns correspond to structural network properties of node i, node j, or some metric relating them. An experimenter is free to choose which metrics to use. The individual node properties we used were node degrees k i , k j ; clustering coefficients c i , c j ; eccentricities e i , e j ; node betweennesses B i , B j ; eigenvector centralities x i , x j , where x i is the i-th element of the leading eigenvector of the network's adjacency matrix; and closeness centralities C i , C j . For node-pair properties we used the length L i j of the shortest topological path between i and j. Finally, we included global network properties N, the number of nodes; M, the number of edges; r, the degree-mixing assortativity coefficient [24] ; and the graph's diameter ∆ and radius ρ.
These global quantities were the same for all rows of D, but providing them gives the optimization method a set of plausible constants to choose from. 1 We then perform symbolic regression (SR) on this dataset to find functions f that predict T i j as a function of the 1 These can also become variables if one chooses to apply SR to a dataset containing multiple networks of different sizes. node pair's structural properties: The SR implementation we used in this study incorporates multiobjective optimization to perform search [26, 27] .
The errors and sizes of the models in the population are computed. Size is defined as the total number of operators and operands in the equation. The Pareto front of models with least error and smallest size is determined, and models off this front are discarded. New models are generated by randomly choosing surviving models on the front. When run against a dataset generated by a single scale-free network composed of N = 250 nodes, the best equation found 2 , in terms of balancing complexity and accuracy, was
This equation achieved a high correlation coefficient of R = 0.88 when compared with the simulated T i j . We remark that Eq. (3) seems plausible in nature: the dominant variable is the distance L i j between i and j, which is intuitive for the transaction model. The degrees of i and j, the clustering of j and global network properties N and the network radius then comprise a small, logarithmic correction to L i j . Other variables did not factor into this function.
Tampered networks
To test the ability of the SR model to indicate the presence of a hidden node, we need access to a ground truth test bed.
To create such a test using our model networks (Sec. 2.1), we generate a new scale-free network, simulate transactions on it (Sec. 2.2), then choose one or more nodes to hide; they are removed before computing the network structural metrics and the information flow times (Eq. (1)). In this way hidden nodes fully participate in the flow of packets, but otherwise they are unknown to the symbolically regressed model. Comparing the SR model's delay predictions (Eq. (3)) to the simulated delay times, we can a posteriori search for systematic errors among the neighbors of the hidden node or nodes.
To measure the effects of the hidden node we study three quantities. The first is the coefficient of determination R 2 between the T i j 's measured for the non-hidden node-pairs from the transaction simulations and the predicted T i j 's from the SR model, where R is the Pearson correlation coefficient. If the value of R 2 drops significantly compared to R 2 for the untampered network, then that supports the ability for us to detect missing or hidden nodes.
Beyond this global measure we also use two local measurements to assess the effect a hidden node has on a single non-hidden node i:
where the expectation E j [·] runs over all (non-hidden) nodes j i that are connected to i (L i j < ∞), and T 
Results
Our first experiment consisted of measuring the change in the coefficient of determination R 2 for tampered scale-free networks (Sec. 2.4). To do this we first generated an ensemble of 100 untampered scale-free networks (Sec. 2.1) and simulated transactions on each (Sec. 2.2). We applied the SR model of T i j to these networks (Eq. (3)) and computed R 2 for each. As shown in Fig. 2A , the distribution of R 2 was sharply peaked around R 2 ≈ 0.77, the value that the SR model achieved on its training data (Sec. 2.3). The narrowness of this distribution indicates that the SR model has useful predictive power.
Next we generated another ensemble of scale-free networks and simulated transactions, but now we tampered with each network by hiding one random hub 3 . We see a significant drop in accuracy (lower R 2 ) for the SR model on these Using the distribution of R 2 for the untampered network as the null model, we standardize the R 2 distribution for networks with one hidden node. Looking at this distribution we see that nearly 60% of the time we can successfully detect that a relatively high degree node is absent with 95% confidence. If we consider lower degree hidden nodes, which are more challenging to discover as they tend to participate less in information flow, this drops to approximately 25%. Distributions shown in panel A were computed using kernel density estimation; each curve was truncated at the largest value observed in the ensemble data to indicate the empirical ranges of R 2 .
tampered networks (Mann-Whitney U test p < 10 −10 , Cohen's d = −0.898), indicating that we are likely to see the effect of a hidden node by a drop in the accuracy of the model. Hiding multiple hubs leads to even greater losses in accuracy ( Fig. 2A and inset) .
However, the comparisons shown in Fig. 2A are for an ensemble of networks, while practically we seek to detect the presence of a missing node in a single network. To determine if this is feasible we standardized the distribution of R 2 for the ensemble of networks with a single hidden hub relative to the untampered ensemble, giving a z-score z(R 2 )
for each tampered network. Large negative values of z indicate a statistically significant drop in R 2 . The cumulative probability distribution shown in Fig. 2B tells us that nearly 60% of the tampered ensemble has z(R 2 ) < −1.6449, meaning that nearly 60% of the time we can determine with 95% confidence that a single network is missing a hub.
The 50% confidence limit, z < 0, corresponding to how well we can beat a coin-flip, is nearly 90%.
These results indicate that the presence of a single hidden node can often be detected. An important question, however, is whether or not we can identify the location of this hidden node. To study this, we computed the errors and biases (Eqs. (4) and (5)) of each node in a tampered network. If the neighbors of the hidden node show significant error or bias, then that means we can determine the location of the hidden node. We show a network diagram of one tampered scale-free network in Fig. 3A . Node color and size is proportional to RMSE and the hidden node is indicated with a diamond ( ). We observe that many neighbors of the hidden node have far greater RMSE than other nodes in the network. This is exactly the evidence needed to estimate the hidden node's location within the network topology.
To 
Discussion
We have shown that the presence of hidden nodes can be inferred by modeling how network topology influences a dynamical process overlaying that network. We focused on an idealized information flow dynamics but there is great potential for applying this to other model dynamics. For future work, we intend to use our methodology alongside real world data on information cascades and other dynamical processes and to further study how different classes of network topologies help or hinder the node discovery process. We also plan to better incorporate the directionality of information flow, which was neglected here by the absolute value used in the equation for T i j .
It is not particularly surprising that perturbing a network, which then leads to perturbed metrics such as those used in Eq. 2, will lead to a reduction in the accuracy of an SR model (e.g., Eq. 3). This was shown in Fig. 2 . However, we have shown (Fig. 3 ) that the loss in accuracy is localized and correlates with the position of the defect, indicating that we are extracting useful information and not merely randomizing the terms within the SR model's functional form.
More generally, looking for discrepancies in the speed of information flow (or other quantities) can be used to study not just missing nodes but other defects and errors, such as missing links or false links that incorrectly appear The next-nearest neighbors have errors comparable to non-neighbors (p = 0.052) but we see a greater number of outliers skewing upward. This indicates that there are some network effects in how errors propagate, but they are relatively rare. Likewise, we see positive bias for neighbor nodes, significantly higher than for non-neighbors (Mann-Whitney U test p 10 −10 , Cohen's d = 3.37). This positive bias indicates that information spreads faster from (or to) neighbors of the hidden node than the SR model expects, supporting the intuition behind Fig. 1 To control for the centrality of the hidden node, in each realization the hidden node was the node with the fifth highest degree.
in the network, false nodes that do not actually exist, the splitting of a true node into multiple false nodes, or the merging of multiple true nodes into a single false node. Some of these errors will likely prove more challenging to detect than others, but the benchmarking procedure we have introduced here may offer some hope towards tackling these problems.
